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Abstract  
This paper uses a two-year panel dataset on hospitals from the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) to evaluate the effect a policy change has on the marginal product of 
medical residents. A weighted 2SLS approach is used to estimate a semi-parametric 
production function. A policy restricting medical residents to work no more than 80 hours 
a week is found to result in a net loss of 14 inpatient days per resident annually, which is 
not statistically different from zero. In addition, the model presented in this paper performs 
better than past models when estimating first-order effects of inputs in the hospital 
production function.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
On May 1, 2003, the Council of Teaching Hospitals restricted the maximum 
number of hours worked by a resident to 80 hours a week.  Noncompliance of this policy 
results in a loss of accreditation for the violating residency program.  In this study, the role 
of a medical resident in the hospital production function is estimated using a semi-
parametric model.  The relationship between physicians and medical residents enter the 
production function non-parametrically.  The estimator presented in this paper produces 
more precise estimates of first-order effects in production than those found in fully 
parametric models currently in the literature.  Further, the model identifies changes in the 
marginal product and elasticity of substitution between inputs of the production function as 
a result of work-hour restrictions placed on medical residents.   
The economic literature has numerous studies investigating the role and the 
demand for physician services (Cockx and Brasseur 2003), but medical residents have 
seldom been studied.  The literature on medical residents is concentrated on the choice of 
medical specialization (Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2003; Nicholson and Souleles 2002; 
Nicholson 2003).  These studies find that the choice of medical specialization is very 
sensitive to expected future incomes in each specialization.  The authors claim that the 
large wage gap between specializations can be attributed to existing barriers to entry in the 
non-primary medicine specializations by limiting the number of total medical residents in 
these fields.   
Once the choice of specialization has occurred, then a medical resident becomes an 
input into the hospital production function.  The medical resident enters separately from 
physicians in the production function because of a difference in experience, which may 
lead to differences in productivity.  Early studies use a Cobb-Douglas production function 
to estimate the relationship between the inputs and number of patients served (Lave 1970; 
Reinhardt 1971).  Both models recognized that physicians and medical residents are two 
separate inputs and treats them as such in the production function.  Jensen and Morrisey 
(1986) overcome some of the functional restriction of the Cobb-Douglas by using a 
Translog production function.  The Translog function incorporates second-order and 
interaction terms, which are absent in the Cobb-Douglas model.  The authors find the 
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elasticity of substitution between physicians and nurses to be close to zero and the 
marginal product of the last medical resident to not be statistically different from zero.  The 
model presented in this study departs from the previous literature in two ways.  First, the 
model relaxes structural constraints placed upon the estimation of the hospital production 
function by a fully parameterized model.  Physicians and medical residents enter the 
production function non-parametrically to allow for richer non-linear effects on hospital 
production.  Secondly, the model introduces instruments for the hospital inputs to remove 
simultaneity bias ignored by previous studies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following fashion.  Section 2 
summarizes the events leading to the restriction in medical resident work hours.  Section 3 
develops the empirical model of hospital production.  Section 4 describes the estimation 
strategy.  Section 5 gives a description of the data.  The results of the estimation are 
described in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes the paper with a concise description of the 
results and provides suggestions for public policy.  
 
Section 2: Background 
 
 In 1984, an 18-year old woman died from an apparent adverse reaction to the 
medicine given to her while in a New York City hospital.  The court ruled that the 
excessively long work hours of the resident in care of this patient were to blame.   
 
In October 1987, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Emergency Services of New 
York State Department of Health adopted the following recommendations as a result to 
the court hearing: 
• 24 hour supervision of acute care inpatient units by experienced attending 
physicians 
• improved working conditions and greater ancillary support for residents 
• 12-hour work limits for residents and physicians in emergency departments 
• in areas other than the emergency room, a scheduled work week for residents 
not exceeding an average of 80 hours per week over a four-week period and not 
exceeding 24 hours consecutively, with at least one 24 hour period of non-
working time per week (Conigliaro et. al. 1993). 
 
These regulations are known as the New York State Health Code Section 405 Regulations 
and were implemented on July 1, 1989.  In May 2003, the Council of Teaching Hospitals 
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adopted these same regulations nationalizing the policy.  The American Medical School 
Association (AMSA) has lobbied for resident hour reform, and, at this time, has bills in 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  The role of medical residents should be 
of interest to policy makers because the wages and education given to the residents is 
funded through Medicaid.   
 The concern surrounding restrictions on medical resident work hours also exists in 
the international arena.  The international community has taken a lead in labor reform for 
medical residents through the introduction of work hour restrictions as described in Table 
1.  Denmark has the most stringent restriction at 45 hrs/wk, and is followed by the 
European Union at 48 hrs/wk.  The least stringent restriction is found in Australia at 75 
hrs/wk, which is still more conservative than the current restriction in the United States of 
80 hrs/wk. 
 
Section 3: Econometric Model 
 
In this paper the production function is defined semi-parametrically as the sum of a 
linear function and a non-specified g function,  
uPLRPgXY +++= ),,(ln θα  (1) 
where the inputs of the g function are the number of physicians P, the number of residents 
R and a policy dummy variable PL.   The policy dummy variable takes the value of 1 after 
Section 405 has been made law and zero otherwise.  The linear portion of equation (1) is a 
Translog function of the remaining labor inputs, which include the number of registered 
nurses RN and the number of licensed nurses LPN.  The dependent variable Y is the 
hospital output measured as the total number of inpatient days.  The regression constant α 
represents a productivity constant.   The hospital-time specific error u captures 
unobservable quality differences between hospital and across time.  The error term is 
assumed to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ2.   
Specifying the production function in this manner has several advantages.  First, 
the relationship between physicians and residents is isolated from the other inputs.  
Physicians and medical residents are close substitutes, but have a unique relationship in 
that physicians serve as instructors to medical residents.  Second, the non-specified 
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function allows for flexibility in the substitution patterns of these inputs, which could be 
constrained with a structural function. The relationship between registered nurses and 
licenses nurses is not the main concern of this paper, but is still important to capture.  For 
this reason, the use of a Translog function, as described in equation 2,  
[ ] [ ] [ ][ ])ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 5242321 LPNRNLPNRNLPNRNX θθθθθθ ++++= (2) 
allows us to capture the relationship between these inputs beyond first order effects.  The 
Translog function incorporates second order terms and interaction of the inputs.  Defining 
the production in this manner does force the researcher to assume physicians/medical 
residents are additively separable from registered nurses and licensed nurses.    
Lastly, two controls are used to separately identify the effect of the policy on 
production.  A dummy variable for time is used to capture any technological advances 
between the time periods of the two samples.  The dummy variable takes the value of 1 in 
1987 and zero otherwise.  A dummy variable for the state of New York is used to separate 
a state effect from the policy effect.  The policy only affects the state of New York, 
therefore, a state dummy variable is needed to capture variation between states so that the 
policy dummy variable will not also include these variations.  
Instruments 
Olley and Pakes (1996) recognize that firms choose their level of production and 
the number of inputs simultaneously, thus, inputs are econometrically endogenous.  If one 
assumes each hospital maximizes profit subject to input wages and market demand for 
health services then each input can be written as a function of exogenous variables. 
),,,( hhiiih udwwfL −=   (3) 
where wi is the wage of Lih, w-i are the wages of other inputs, dh are demand shifters for 
hospital services, and uh is a hospital specific component unobserved by the 
econometrician.  These components of the labor demand function can be used as 
instruments for the inputs in the production function. 1 
                                                 
1 There exist an equilibrium problem in the labor market. The labor market for health professionals is much 
larger than the consumer market that each hospital serves.  Without perfect information, health professionals 
are not able to solve local consumer demand functions and make wage offers to all hospitals in the different 
consumer markets. Therefore, the labor market need not clear. 
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The observable characteristics of agents in an MSA serve as instruments.  
Specifically, the characteristics of income per capita, population, and percentage with 
group health insurance, percentage of private health insurance, and percentage with a 
secondary health insurance per MSA are good instruments because they are correlated with 
the inputs as demand shifters, but are uncorrelated with the unobserved hospital specific 
error.  Other agent characteristics such as sex, race, and age were considered as potential 
instruments, but were not highly correlated with the inputs.   
Wage data is the source of another instrument.  The mean wage per MSA for 
registered nurses and licensed practical nurses serve as instruments.  The wages of 
physicians and medical residents could not be used as instruments because the PUMS data 
source for these wages classifies physicians and medical residents in the same category.   
Lastly, a variable capturing the level of competition within a city is created from 
the cost data of each hospital.  The instrument is constructed by dividing the total operation 
cost of each individual hospital TCht by the total operation cost of all hospitals within a 
city.  The set of hospitals within city (i) is represented by Hi .   
∑
∈
=
iHk
kt
ht
ht TC
TCC   (4) 
The competition variable Cht describes the level of concentration of health services hospital 
(h) has within a group of hospitals Hi .  The competition variable is continuous between 
zero and unity.  A value of one would represent a monopoly. 
 
Section 4: Estimation strategy 
 
The challenge of estimating this production function is simultaneously handling the 
endogeneity of the inputs and estimate the non specified function, g(٠).  To confront this 
difficulty, the parameters and g(٠) of the production function are estimated simultaneously 
using two stage least squares with weights (2SLSW).  As proposed by Ichimura (1993), the 
non-specified function for each hospital is assigned a numerical value by solving equation 
(1) for g(٠).  
),,()ln(~ hthththththththt PlRPguXYY =−−≡ θ   (1’) 
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A kernel function places weights on each of these numerical values to estimate g(٠). 
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The kernel function is equal to a tri-variate normal probability density function where the 
off diagonal elements in the covariance matrix are equal to zero.  The bandwidths bp, br, 
and bpl are equal to the standard deviations of log (P), log(R), and PL, respectively.  The 
variable n is the total number of observations.  
One would normally proceed by minimizing a loss function over the parameters,θ. 
∑
=
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This estimation procedure is similar to minimizing the sum of squared errors.  One can 
achieve the same results through a different method.  Given that the kernel function does 
not contain parameters to be estimated, equation (5) can be rewritten in the following way. 
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Next, one can construct an nxn weight matrix where (i) indexes the rows and (j) indexes 
the columns.  Each row contains the weights necessary to estimate gi(٠) and the sum of the 
weights in each row equal 1.  The matrix can be read in the following way, w12 represents 
the weight placed on g2(٠) to estimate g1(٠). 
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 The estimated vector, ),,(ˆ PlRPg  is constructed by multiplying the weight matrix, 
W, by the vector g(٠).  The error term drops out of equation (6) because the weight matrix 
simply takes a weighted average of the error, which has mean zero. 
),,(ˆ))(ln())(ln(~ PlRPgXYWuXYWYW =−=−−= θθ  (6) 
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Replacing g(٠) in equation (1) with ),,(ˆ PlRPg  and solving for the dependent variable 
reveals a simple linear regression equation.  
uXWIYWI +−=− θ)()ln()(  (7) 
XXWIVYWI ~)()ln()( =−=−     
uXV += θ~  (7’) 
Instrumental variables and two stage least squares techniques can be used on equation (7’) 
in the traditional fashion to remove the endogeneity in X. 
XWIZZZZXZZZZX )(')'(~')'(ˆ 11 −== −−  
SLS2θˆ VXXX 'ˆ)~'ˆ( 1−=  
The estimator gives consistent estimates of SLS2θˆ .2 
 
Section 5: Data 
 
The data are from four sources: the American Hospital Association (AHA), March 
Current Population Surveys, Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), and Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).  The AHA data provides annual hospital 
characteristics on the number of inpatient days, physicians, medical residents, registered 
nurses, licensed nurses, hospital beds, and other cost characteristics.  A sample of both 
teaching and non-teaching hospitals was obtained for the years of 1987 and 1991.  1987 is 
selected as the starting year because it is sufficiently before the enactment of Section 405 
in 1989 that the hospitals would not have adjusted their production decisions in 
anticipation of the law.  These two samples provide a two-year panel dataset.   
 The number of inpatient days has been selected as a measure of output for each 
hospital.  Inpatient days are not a perfect measure of production because it cannot be 
considered a completely homogenous good.   Hospitals provide a wide range of services 
each at a different cost.  Therefore, the level of care is not completely captured by the 
number of inpatient days.   
                                                 
2 In the appendix I show how 2SLS and IV work in this framework.  
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To remedy this problem, I use the case mix index, as suggested by Jensen and 
Morrisey (1986), to weight the number of inpatient days for each hospital.  The case mix 
index is a weighted sum of Medicare cost for different diagnostic service in a hospital.  
These sums are then normalized into an index where the average cost of health care service 
receives a value of 1.  The level of care is captured by the cost of providing the service.  
Each hospital with a Medicare provider number is assigned a case mix value.  Multiplying 
the case mix value by the number of inpatient days allows one to adjust output between 
hospitals into a more homogenous good.  The case mix index is highly correlated with 
itself from year to year with a correlation coefficient of .97.  Therefore, the 1992 case mix 
index is used to substitute the case mix indices of 1987 and 1991, which were not 
available.  The case mix index is provided by CMS.        
 The instruments used in this project are obtained from the March CPS for the years 
of 1987 and 1991 as well as the 5% PUMS for the years of 1980 and 1990.  The March 
CPS provides the percentage of households with group health insurance, with private 
health insurance, and with secondary health insurance in each MSA.  The March CPS also 
provides average income for each MSA.  Wages in 1987 and 1991 for the inputs are not 
readily available through AHA.  Instead, the average earnings by MSA from the 5% 
PUMS in 1980 and 1990 is used.  Physicians and medical residents are classified the same 
in the PUMS.  For this reason, the average earnings of physicians are not used.  The wages 
of medical residents are known, but have little variation over specialization or hospital.  
Therefore, medical resident wages are poor instruments.  All measurements of income 
were adjusted into 1991 dollars using the CPI index provided by the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.     
 
Section 6.1: Estimation Results 
 
The performance of the semi-parametric model is compared against two alternative 
definitions of the production function, the Cobb Douglas Production function and the 
Translog Production function.  The results of the Cobb Douglas production function are 
located in Table 4.  Prior models assume that the endogeneity bias of the inputs is very 
small and statistically not significant. The Hausman test, using the instruments described 
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earlier, finds that at least one variable is endogenous at α=.10 in the OLS regressions of the 
Cobb-Douglas function. The marginal product for a medical resident in this framework is 
close to zero.  The Cobb-Douglas appears to perform poorly when estimating first-order 
effects of the inputs on production.   
In contrast to the Cobb-Douglas production function, Jensen and Morrisey (1986) 
use a Translog production function where the inputs are physicians, residents, registered 
nurses, and hospital beds.  An F-test is used to test the null hypothesis that input 
interactions and second order terms in the Translog function have coefficients equal to zero 
against the alternative that at least one is different from zero. The F-statistic is equal to 
34.135, which rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. This finding 
indicates that physicians and nurses are not additively separable.   
The Jensen and Morrisey model contains mild multicollinearity in that the number 
of hospital beds can be well explained by the other inputs. When simply regressing the 
other inputs on the number of hospital beds, one finds an R2 close to 80%.  A hospital bed 
is capital that is fixed in the short-run, and variable in the long-run. Therefore, hospitals 
can choose various combinations of labor inputs that are variable in the short run to fit the 
quasi-fixed number of hospital beds.  As described by the OLS 1 regression in Table 5, the 
marginal product of a medical resident is positive and statistically different from zero when 
hospital beds are removed from the production function. This result differs from Jensen 
and Morrisey (1986) who find medical residents have a marginal product of zero. In 
addition, the authors do not use any instruments to correct for bias in the estimated 
parameters.  
 
Section 6.2: Estimation Results of Semi-parametric Production Function 
 
The estimates of the parameters in the semi-parametric production function are 
found in table 6. All the inputs of production are found to be endogenous by the Hausman 
test when adjusting the number of inpatient days using the case mix index. Three variables 
are found to be endogenous when not adjusting the number of inpatient days. These results 
would suggest the OLS bias is larger than previously found in the literature. Table 7 
displays the dominance the semi-parametric model has in estimating the marginal product 
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of physicians and residents over the two parametric models, Cobb-Douglas and Translog.  
Both fully parametric models perform well when estimating the marginal product of 
physicians, but fail to produce realistic estimates of the marginal product of medical 
residents, where the highest value found is 1.6320 inpatients per day.  The Translog 
production function rejects that nurses and physicians are additively separable, but the 
semi-parametric model does a much better job estimating the first order effects of medical 
residents.  The marginal product values found by the semi-parametric production function 
more closely resemble the actual reported patient loads found in several residency 
programs of 10-15 patients. The 2SLS semi-parametric estimates provide marginal product 
values of 9.47 and 14.31, for physicians and medical residents, respectively, after adjusting 
inpatient days by the case mix index. 
It is important to note that the adjusted inpatient days have given more weight to 
hospitals that provide more services such as teaching hospitals. Sloan and Valavona (1985) 
make the point that costs are found to be relatively higher at teaching hospitals than at non-
teaching. In particular, teaching hospitals have higher costs because medical residents 
order more tests than are necessary as a learning experience.  These additional tests do 
improve the quality of care, but also increase the cost of care. For these reasons it is 
expected that teaching hospitals would receive higher case mix index values.   Therefore, 
the results presented in this study are focused on the activities at teaching hospitals and not 
hospitals in general.  
The marginal product of a physician is found to be lower than that of a medical 
resident in the estimation results. These results are also driven by the characteristics of 
teaching hospitals. Physicians at teaching hospitals must dedicate a portion of their time to 
non-productive activities as teaching and research; thus, their marginal products are lower 
relative to medical residents, who do not have additional non-productive responsibilities. 
The elasticity of substitution between physicians and medical residents is 
calculated, using both adjusted inpatient days and unadjusted inpatient days. A 1% 
increase in the number of physicians leads to a 4.768 (.23) decrease in the number of 
medical residents using case mix adjusted inpatient days. A 1% increase in the number of 
physicians leads to a 4.396 (.33) decrease in the number of medical residents using 
inpatient days as the dependent variable. Both values are evaluated at the mean, and the 
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standard errors are in parentheses. In addition, the elasticity of substitution between 
physicians and registered nurses is -9 (1.31). 
 
Section 6.3: How would hospitals react to a national restriction of resident work hours? 
 
In this section, a counterfactual experiment is performed to evaluate the effects of a 
nationwide restriction on medical resident work hours.  Using the estimated parameters, 
the marginal product for physicians and residents in each hospital is calculated setting the 
policy dummy variable, PL, equal to 1 for all hospitals. Next, the process is repeated but 
PL is equal to zero for all hospitals. The marginal product of physicians (residents) when 
PL is equal to zero is subtracted from the marginal product of physicians (residents) when 
PL is equal to one. This procedure obtains marginal product values for both physicians and 
residents in each hospital prior and post the implementation of the policy. These marginal 
product values can now be used to perform hypothesis testing. 
The results of the hypothesis test, where the null states that marginal product of 
physicians (medical residents) remains the same after the policy against the alternative that 
the policy has decreased the marginal product of physicians (medical residents), can be 
found in table 8. The policy does improve marginal product of physicians at the 99% level 
of confidence. The increase in marginal product for physicians allows them to produce an 
additional 57 inpatient days, or an additional 30 case mix adjusted inpatient days, annually. 
The policy does decrease marginal product of the medical resident, but when using 
inpatient days as the output, the change in marginal product as a result of the policy is not 
statistically different from zero at the 95% level. The slight fall in marginal product for 
medical residents decreases the number of inpatient days by only 14 days annually, and 
decreases the number of case mix adjusted inpatient days by 44 days annually. The fall in 
casemix adjusted inpatient days could be attributed to the fall in unnecessary lab work 
because physicians, instead of medical residents, are ordering the tests.  Experience 
physicians ask for fewer lab tests than medical residents thus decreasing costs associated 
with care.  
Considering only inpatient days as a measure of production suggests that placing a 
work limit on residents does not harm their performance in a statistically significant way, 
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thus leading to a Pareto improvement. The overall effect the policy has on production is 
inconclusive. The reform leads to a net gain in production of 43 inpatient days annually, 
but a loss of 14 case mix adjusted inpatient days annually when comparing the change in 
marginal products of physicians to medical residents. The annual change for case mix 
adjusted inpatient days appears to be small. 
 
Section 7: Conclusion 
 
Past models have placed a structural relationship on physicians and residents, as 
well as ignored that the inputs of the hospital production function are endogenous. By not 
removing the bias, authors have underestimated the marginal product of physicians and 
residents. A downward bias on the estimate of marginal product for medical residents 
suggest that there exist a negative correlation between the number of medical residents and 
the hospital specific error in production. This correlation most likely arises from the dual 
responsibilities of teaching residents and providing care in teaching hospitals. Time spent 
teaching a medical resident is time not spent on productive activities. This reasoning would 
lead to a decrease in production as the number of medical residents increase in teaching 
hospitals relative to non-teaching hospitals of the same size. 
This paper presents an alternative method to estimate the hospital production 
function, which does produce estimates of marginal product that more resemble real world 
observations.  Introducing a policy change into the production function allows the model to 
identify changes in substitution patterns between physicians and medical residents. Section 
405 is a source of variation in hospital choice of input bundles that may not be captured by 
a well-defined structural model.  The empirical evidence has shown that Section 405 has 
not hurt the marginal product of medical residents in the state of New York by a 
statistically significant margin, and has shown that this law may improve the productivity 
of physicians. The increase in productivity in physicians may be due to physicians working 
longer hours to regain the number of inpatient days loss by the work hour restriction on 
medical residents.  The decrease in productivity for residents maybe minimized by an 
improvement in scheduling on the part of each hospital due to Section 405. 
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Finally, the results have implications on how teaching hospitals should respond to 
the nationwide reduction on resident hours.  The work restriction should cause an increase 
in demand for residency positions in non-primary medical fields.   The work hour 
restriction should cause a decrease in the average number of hours worked by non-primary 
medicine resident and should have little to no affect on the average hours worked by 
primary medicine residents.   
Residency programs have contemplated increasing the number of years in their 
training programs to compensate for the loss of hours due to the reform; but the results 
presented would suggest that each resident actually receives relatively the same length of 
instructional time both prior and after the policy is in effect. An increase in the years of 
training will only lead to an increase in cost for the residency program, and will also 
reduce the supply of residents entering those programs. Graduating medical students will 
be discouraged from entering long residency programs because they will have to forgo an 
additional year of a full physicians salary and/or the start of a family. These are high 
opportunity costs for graduating medical students, who have already acquired much debt in 
the form of school loans, and who may have already forgone four years to start a family. 
An alternative option is to increase the number of available slots to solve 
scheduling difficulties. The addition of one resident increases the flexibility of scheduling 
by 80 hours a week. Teaching hospitals and Medicaid would have to agree to increase 
funding for surgery residency programs in order to increase the number of available slots.  
If an agreement can be made the effects would be two fold.  First, more residents would be 
available to ease scheduling difficulties.  Second, the increase in the number of surgical 
residents will eventually lead to an increase in the number of surgeons and a decrease in 
the price of surgery.  I would recommend continuing the use of the current admission 
process and possibly opening new slots for more demanding fields of specialization, such 
as surgery. After all, the reform is only calling to reduce the number of hours worked by a 
medical resident to a maximum of two full time jobs. 
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Appendix 
2SLS and IV in a semi-parametric framework 
 
Our original equation is found below 
uXWIYWI +−=− θ)()ln()(   
Let our dependent variable and explanatory variables be define as found below. 
XXWIVYWI ~)()ln()( =−=−     
Substituting these values into the first equation, we get a simple linear equation with no 
constant 
uXV += θ~   
Now using a set of suitable instruments Z, we project the explanatory variable onto 
Z making them exogenous 
XWIZZZZXZZZZX )(')'(~')'(ˆ 11 −== −−  
Then the unbias linear estimator of the parameters can be found as 
VXXX
YWIZZZZWIXXWIZZZZWIX
YWIZZZZWIXXWIZZZZZZZZWIX
VXXXSLS
'ˆ)~'ˆ(
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111
1111
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−
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When Z and X are of the same dimensions then our equation is just identified and 
we can reduce the 2SLS to an IV estimator. 
IV
SLS
YWIZXWIZ
YWIZZZZWIXZWIXZZXWIZ
YWIZZZZWIXXWIZZZZWIX
VXXX
θ
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TABLE 1 
 Total 
Hours 
Duty per 
Week 
Maximum 
Hours on 
Duty 
Maximum 
Consecutive 
Shifts 
Minimum 
Rest Hours 
Minimum 
Continuous 
Off-Duty 
Hours 
Australia 75 hrs/wk 
(Western 
and 
Victoria) 
70 hrs/wk 
(Tasmania) 
68 hrs/wk 
(South) 
24 
consecutive 
hours for a 
shift 
(Capital 
Territory) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Denmark 45 hrs/wk N/A N/A 11-8 hrs 
between 
shifts 
55 hrs/wk 
United 
Kingdom 
72 hrs/wk 16 hrs a 
shift 
12 regular shifts 
in a row 
8 hrs 
between 
regular 
shifts 
 
12 hrs after 
being on-
call 
N/A 
European 
Union 
48 hrs/wk 
including 
overtime 
Night work 
must not 
exceed 8 
hrs on 
average 
N/A N/A N/A 
Germany 56 hrs/wk 24 
consecutive 
hrs max 
12 consecutive 
on-call duty 
periods 
10 
consecutive 
hrs off after 
working 
more than 
7.5 hrs 
12 
consecutive 
hrs when 
on-call 
Netherlands 48 hrs 
avg/wk 
over 13 
wks and 60 
hrs 
max/wk 
24 
consecutive 
hrs max 
5 shifts worked 
consecutively/wk 
for a max 13 wks 
in 26 
10 
consecutive 
hours 
between 
shifts 
9 hrs rest 
for shifts < 
15 hrs and 
24 hrs rest 
for shifts 
>15 hrs 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
VARIABLES MEAN STD MAX MIN 
DEPENDENT     
INPATIENT DAYS 65337.7 72341.16 713754 128 
CM*INPATIENT DAYS 95223.03 110605.61 918760 770.88 
EXPLANATORY     
PHYSICIANS 12.8746 3.7563 832 2 
RN 139.5601 3.3326 2507 1 
LPN 25.0393 3.6450 390 1 
RESIDENTS 5.7240 7.3721 909 1 
BEDS 226.8910 2.5449 1979 6 
POLICY 0.0755 0.2642 1 0 
NY 0.1105 0.3136 1 0 
TIME 0.2705 0.4443 1 0 
INSTRUMENTS     
INCOME PER CAPITA 13582.01 2217.48 20702 5768.6 
POP. OF SMSA 
(100,000) 41.66 55.68 194.80 1 
RN WAGE IN 1991 $ 20138.24 5227.27 29307 9183.1 
LPN WAGE IN 1991 $ 13756.66 3654.62 24655 4909.8 
GROUP HEALTH 
INSURANCE 0.6106 0.0846 0.8029 0.3310 
SECONDARY 
HEALTH INSURANCE 0.5277 0.2793 0.9270 0.0549 
PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE 0.5197 0.2748 0.9278 0.0632 
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TABLE 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HOSPITAL IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
 1987 1991 
VARIABLES MEAN STD MAX MIN MEAN STD MAX MIN 
DEPENDENT         
INPATIENT DAYS 142559 113803.7 695950 1235 133077.2 116361.9 695950 1235 
CM*INPATIENT 
DAYS 180485.7 148696.3 838132.6 4386.49 171255.84 146145.17 838132.59 4386.49
EXPLANATORY         
PHYSICIANS 57.13 80.2 538 2 48.34 75.44 523 2 
RN 310.37 315.77 1709 7 259.27 292.51 1709 7 
LPN 49.52 43.57 280 2 44.07 41.10 280 2 
RESIDENTS 120.76 150.78 804 2 116.32 156.5819 804 2 
BEDS 396.48 312.42 1789 15 351.5714 303.92 1789 15 
INSTRUMENTS         
INCOME PER 
CAPITA 13487.36 1802.04 17585 9214.2 14330.66 2099.7 20702 6846.8 
POP. OF SMSA 
(100,000) 113.99 91.95 194.80 1 106.19 92.94 194.80 1 
RN WAGE IN 1991 
$ 21356.47 6680.68 28629 10822 25257.89 3985.23 28629 15838 
LPN WAGE IN 1991 
$ 14806.17 4285.48 19917 6317.2 17212.32 2807.93 19917 10877 
GROUP HEALTH 
INSURANCE .5784 .1051 .8232 .409 .5816 .1130 .8232 .4092 
SECONDARY 
HEALTH 
INSURANCE 
.4939 .2792 .9612 .0677 .6746 .1267 .9612 .4852 
PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE .4722 .2602 .9245 .0846 .6414 .1146 .9245 .4976 
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TABLE 4 
COBB DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
DEPENDENT INPATIENT DAYS INPATIENT DAYS *CM 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Variables 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Constant 7.5825*** (.0248) 
4.9789*** 
(.0241) 
7.1213***  
(1.1749) 
5.4860***  
(2.3093) 
7.5294***  
(.0350) 
4.8553*** 
(.0373) 
6.6114***  
(2.3741) 
4.8121***  
(1.8040) 
Physicians .0938*** (.0061) 
.0128*** 
(.0034) 
.0422    
(.1984) 
-.0295    
(.1937) 
.1004***    
(.0085) 
.0128** 
(.0056) 
.1438    
(.1644) 
.1203    
(.1494) 
Residents .0086 (.0063) 
-.0133*** 
(.0035) 
.0965    
(.1283) 
.1244    
(.1268) 
.0023    
(.0075) 
-.0082 
(.0051) 
-.0486    
(.1521) 
-.0189    
(.1431) 
Registered 
Nurses 
.5563*** 
(.0078) 
.0619*** 
(.0057) 
.6775***    
(.1353) 
.3859    
(.4171) 
.5907***    
(.0064) 
.1510*** 
(.0090) 
.7991***    
(.2585) 
.2294    
(.3551) 
Licensed 
Nurses 
.1484*** 
(.0071) 
.0060 
(.0041) 
.1276    
(.1018) 
.0573    
(.1185) 
.1160***    
(.0086) 
-.0028 
(.0060) 
.0450    
(.1664) 
.0047    
(.1549) 
Time -.0513*** (.0220) 
-.1579*** 
(.0120) 
-.2760*    
(.1554) 
-.3608***   
(.1557) 
-.0650**    
(.0340) 
-.1826*** 
(.0208) 
-.1861    
(.2490) 
-.3590*    
(.2091) 
Policy .3514*** (.0456) 
.2663*** 
(.0257) 
.4766    
(.6609) 
.5676    
(.7800) 
.3057***    
(.0518) 
.2647*** 
(.0319) 
.2856    
(.4622) 
0.5742    
0.5024 
Residents x 
Policy 
-.0285 
(.0177) 
-.0279*** 
(.0097) 
-.1462    
(.2538) 
-.2070    
(.2799) 
-.0320*    
(.0178) 
-.0484*** 
(.0121) 
-.0473    
(.1939) 
-.2668    
(.2066) 
Hospital beds  1.0739*** (.0081)  
.6351    
(.5192) 
 1.0736*** (.0130)  
.9325**    
(.4273) 
R2 .7235 .9186   .7874 .9269   
Hausman 
Test   3.190*
a 5.226*b   2.3149 1.887 
N 8061 7410 3443 3197 3725 3562 1502 1458 
*Significant at the 90% level 
**Significant at the 95% level 
***Significant at the 99% level 
aone endogenous variable 
btwo endogenous variables 
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TABLE 5  
The standard errors are found in the parentheses. 
*Significant at the 90% level  **Significant at the 95% level  ***Significant at the 99% level 
 
 
 
 
 
TRANSLOG PRODUCTION FUNCTION (OLS) 
DEPENDENT INPATIENT DAYS INPATIENT DAYS * CM 
VARIABLES 1 2 1 2 
Constant 8.23*** (.1204) 
3.8775*** 
(.0964) 
8.1265*** 
(.0848) 
6.6882*** 
(.0741) 
Physician -.238*** (.0449) 
-.1235*** 
(.0215) 
.3677*** 
(.0533) 
.1179*** 
(.0364) 
Registered Nurse .2583*** (.068) 
.4124*** 
(.0270) 
.2671*** 
(.0368) 
.7735*** 
(.0307) 
Licensed Nurse .36245*** (.045) 
.0599*** 
(.0224) 
.0409 
(.0343) 
.0663** 
(.0307) 
Medical Resident .2425*** (.05) 
-.0171 
(.0279) 
.1211** 
(.0586) 
-.0265 
(.0393) 
PHY2 -.0272*** (.006) 
-.0162*** 
(.0023) 
.0100 
(.0062) 
-.0172*** 
(.0042) 
RN2 .049*** (.001) 
.0532*** 
(.0031) 
.0581*** 
(.0023) 
.0084** 
(.0043) 
LN2 .0508*** (.0067) 
.0083*** 
(.0023) 
.0403*** 
(.0051) 
-.0048 
(.0037) 
RES2 .0094 (.006) 
.0071*** 
(.0024) 
.0003 
(.0059) 
.0163*** 
(.0039) 
PHY*RN -.0148*** (.0012) 
-.0095** 
(.0043) 
-.0729*** 
(.0068) 
.0545*** 
(.0067) 
PHY*LN .0638*** (.0045) 
-.0050* 
(.0027) 
.0298*** 
(.0070) 
-.0027 
(.0048) 
PHY*RES -.0057* (.007) 
-.0004 
(.0018) 
-.0088* 
(.0046) 
.0024 
(.0031) 
RN*LN -.1055*** (.0012) 
.0291*** 
(.0043) 
-.0264*** 
(.0068) 
.0355*** 
(.0068) 
RN*RES -.0165* (.0050) 
.0049 
(.0050) 
.0019 
(.0072) 
-.0483*** 
(.0070) 
LN*RES -.0395*** (.0043) 
-.0037 
(.0025) 
-.0322*** 
(.0061) 
-.0121*** 
(.0041) 
TIME -.072*** (.0275) 
-.1498*** 
(.0118) 
-.1091*** 
(.0354) 
-.1848*** 
(.0231) 
POLICY .1200 (.0817) 
.1113*** 
(.0375) 
.1464 
(.0970) 
.1746*** 
(.0628) 
RES*POLICY -.0073 (.0187) 
-.0172*** 
(.0087) 
-.0370** 
(.0189) 
-.0502*** 
(.0123) 
NY .187*** (.063) 
.1441*** 
(.0279) 
.1721** 
(.0823) 
.0962* 
(.0533) 
BEDS  1.2624*** (.0408)  
-.2768*** 
(.0209) 
BEDS2  .0524*** (.0029)  
.2206*** 
(.0021) 
BEDS*PHY  .0492*** (.0045)  
-.0618*** 
(.0051) 
BEDS*RN  -.1700*** (.0074)  
-.1624*** 
(.0063) 
BEDS*LN  -.0411*** (.0050)  
-.0389*** 
(.0066) 
BEDS*RES  -.0046 (.0055)  
.0480*** 
(.0051) 
R2 .737 .9242 .7980 .9756 
N 8061 7410 3725 3725 
 
  
 
TABLE 6 
SEMI-PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE HOSPITAL PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
DEPENDENT INPATIENT DAYS INPATIENT DAYS * CM 
VARIABLES LEAST SQUARES 2SLS LEAST SQUARES 2SLS 
RN -.0370         (.0822) 1.2394     (1.2989)  .1631       (.1418)  .4640         (1.4102) 
LPN .6275****    (.0523) -1.7326    (1.4248)  .3183****      (.0813) -3.134****    (1.5335) 
RN*RN .0851****    (.0031) -.1843****    (.0437)  .0563****      (.0043) -.1852****    (.0394) 
LPN*LPN .0457****    (.0065) -.0567    (.1726)  .0393****      (.0085) -.0728        (.0832) 
RN*LPN -.1287****    (.0082) .4296*     (.2293)  -.0761****     (.0107)  .6479****    (.1091) 
TIME -.0759****    (.0305) -.1432*    (.0801)  -.1020****     (.0458) -.1376**     (.0705) 
NY .2720****    (.0395) .1838    (.1487)  .2334****      (.0663)  .2605*      (.1414) 
Hausman Test 7.3931*a 15.1258***b 
N 1687 1687 1502 1502 
The standard errors are found in the parentheses. 
*Significant at the 90% level 
**Significant at the 95% level 
***Significant at the 97.5% level 
****Significant at the 99% level 
athree endogenous variables 
bfive endogenous variables 
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TABLE 7 
MARGINAL PRODUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND MEDICAL RESIDENTS BY INPATIENT DAYS PER DAY 
DEPENDENT INPATIENT DAYS INPATIENT DAYS * CM 
MODELS PHYSICIANS RESIDENTS PHYSICIANS RESIDENTS 
COBB DOUGLAS     
OLS (1) 1.5253 .091 8.9219 .2043 
OLS(2) .2081 -.1198 1.1420 -.7284 
2SLS(1) .6882 .991 12.8297 -4.3174 
2SLS(2) -.4797 1.3184 10.7330 -1.6790 
TRANS LOG      
OLS (1) .511 .120 9.827 1.6320 
OLS(2) 3.287 -.1519 3.0283 -2.080 
SEMI-PARAMETRIC     
LEAST SQUARES 1.5956 1.9101 1.8058 1.101 
2SLS 8.7068*** 
(21.1195) 
16.9233*** 
(14.5475) 
9.4698*** 
(13.1027) 
14.3058*** 
(8.0926) 
T statistics are in parentheses testing the null that marginal product is zero. 
***Significant at the 95% level 
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TABLE 8 
THE EFFECT THAT THE POLICY HAS ON MARGINAL PRODUCT 
 
The null hypothesis is the policy has no effect on marginal product against the alternative that the policy increases marginal product. 
DEPENDT VARIABLE INPATIENT DAYS CM*INPATIENT DAYS 
2SLS Model PHYSICIANS RESIDENTS PHYSICIANS RESIDENTS 
Mean annual improvement 
in marginal product 56.637*** -13.572 29.5974*** -44.0046*** 
T statistic 10.6035 -1.7131 4.3760 -3.4814 
***Significant at the 95% level 
 
